Competition regulation for digital markets: The South African experience
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23962/ajic.i31.16013Keywords:
digital markets, competition, regulation, mergers, abuse of dominance, cartel conduct, South AfricaAbstract
The study examines the recent experiences of South Africa’s competition authorities in engaging with competition matters in the country’s digital markets. Specifically, the authors examine engagements by the Competition Commission South Africa (CCSA), the Competition Tribunal of South Africa, and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) with three regulatory elements: (1) mergers, examined through the MIH and WeBuyCars and Google and Fitbit cases; (2) abuse of dominance, examined through the GovChat v Facebook case; and (3) cartel conduct, examined through the Competition Commission v Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited & Others case. In reviewing the decisions made in these cases, the authors highlight regulatory considerations that are coming to the fore in response to competition matters in digital markets.
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References
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Copyright (c) 2023 Phathutshedzo Manenzhe, Simphiwe Gumede
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